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We verify whether an income support policy for part-time workers in Belgium increases the 
transition from unemployment to non-subsidised, “regular” employment. Using a sample of 
8630 long-term unemployed young women, whose labour market history is observed from 
1998 to 2001, we implement the “timing of events” approach proposed by Abbring et Van den 
Berg  (2003)  to  control  for  selection  effects.  Our  results  suggest  that  the  policy  has  a 
significantly positive effect on the transition to non-subsidised employment when one does not 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. This effect remains positive, but becomes insignificant, 
when one corrects for selection on unobservable characteristics. 
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  The high and persistent unemployment rate encountered in many European countries 
has been a major concern of policy makers for over twenty-five years. Since the Amsterdam 
Treatise was adopted (in June 1997), the European Union (EU) explicitly recommends the 
implementation  of  “active”  labour  market  policies  (hereafter  ALMP):  unemployment 
insurance systems should be reformed to enhance employability and to favour the transition of 
unemployed workers towards employment. One of these ALMP is income support granted to 
low-wage and/or part-time workers. Income support has been provided in several European 
countries (including Belgium, France, and the UK) and will be the focus of our analysis. 
 
  In Belgium, since 1980, unemployed workers who have accepted a part-time job and 
who  are  still  looking  for  full-time  employment  are  allowed  to  keep  a  fraction  of  their 
unemployment benefits. In 1993, this led to the creation of a new legal status: that of “part-
time  worker  with  entitlement  (to  unemployment  benefits)”.  These  part-time  workers  are 
granted an income premium, known as AGR (Allocation Garantie de Revenu). Theoretically, 
it is unclear whether AGR is a stepping-stone to regular employment. On the one hand, the 
labour market experience that a worker may acquire during the course of this ALMP could 
increase  his/her  employability.  On  the  other  hand,  because  of  its  design,  this  policy  may 
create  a  “part-time  employment  trap”:  indeed,  the  income  support  decreases  in  direct 
proportion  to  an  increase  in  the  worker’s  wage.  The  objective  of  the  present  study  is  to 
determine which of the two effects actually prevails. 
 
  Our evaluation concerns only a subset of the eligible population. First of all, men are 
not taken into account: the small number of male recipients would make the econometric 
analysis awkward at best. Second, the Belgian government sponsored this study in order to 
identify, among existing ALMP, those that are most likely to help disadvantaged youth out of 
unemployment. We therefore retained, for our analysis, a population of 8630 young long-term 
unemployed women without any labour market experience. They were selected nine month 
after  graduating  (at  various  levels  of  education),  at  the  moment  they  were  entitled  to 
unemployment  benefits.  The  choice  of  this  population  was  dictated  by  a  concern  for 
alleviating the serious problems met by young people (and especially young women) on the 
Belgian labour market. 
 
  The paper is organized as follows. A first section describes the institutional context of 
the Belgian unemployment insurance system and the AGR. A second section surveys the 
empirical  literature  dedicated  to  the  evaluation  of  income-support  policies.  The  third  and 
fourth  sections  respectively  present  our  data  and  econometric  model.  The  results  of  our 
analysis are presented in Section 5. Conclusions are given in a final section. 
 
1.  Institutional context. 
 
In Belgium, eligibility to unemployment insurance corresponds to two different labour 
market situations. On the one hand, as in many countries, when a worker loses her job
4, she is 
entitled  to  unemployment  benefits,  provided  that  she  contributed  to  the  unemployment 
insurance system while she was working. In that case, eligibility depends on the length of the 
previous employment spell, and, legally, this length increases with age
5. On the other hand, 
the Belgian system is very specific, in the sense that unemployed  youth (below 30) may 
obtain entitlement to unemployment benefits, provided: (i) that they were registered in the 
                                                 
4 In the rest of the text, we use “she” instead of “he/she” and her instead of “his/her”. 
5 Special conditions apply to workers having followed courses in “second chance” education, in training centres 
for the self-employed, or in part-time vocational education.   2 
 
third year
6 of secondary education or at a higher level and (ii) that they did not drop out 
before the end of the school year (on June, 30
th). They do not have to pass the exams
7.  
 
Young job seekers who have just left the education system, have to go through a 
‘waiting period’ before being formally entitled to unemployment benefits. The length of this 
waiting period depends on age: 6 months for job seekers below 18, 9 months for job seekers 
aged 18-25, and 12 month for those aged 19-26. Our analysis is concerned with a sample of 
18 to 25 year-old women who, at the end of the waiting period, are still looking for a job. 
Their  date  of  entry  into  the  database  corresponds  to  their  date  of  entry  in  ‘insured’ 
unemployment, i.e. to the date when they first receive unemployment benefits
8. 
 
The level of unemployment benefits in Belgium depends on the last wage (for those 
who were previously employed), the length of the unemployment spell, on family status, and 
on age. For unemployed youth without labour market experience, only family status and/or 
age are taken into account. For instance, in December 2005, monthly unemployment benefits 
for the 18-25 year old were equal to: 872 euros for cohabitants with children, 361 euros for 
cohabitants without children (if both cohabitants are unemployed), 339 euros for cohabitants 
without children.  For singles, monthly unemployment benefits depend only on age: 381 euros 
if aged 18-20, 626 euros if aged 21-24, and 620 euros for ages 25 and up. Different from any 
other OECD country, these benefits are provided without any time limit.   
 
The existence of unemployment benefits for youth without labour market experience 
is a unique institutional arrangement. It is justified (from a political point of view) by the fact 
that youth unemployment is extremely high in Belgium: in 2003, the unemployment rate of 
the 15-24 year old was equal to 21%, whereas the average unemployment rate in Belgium was 
equal to 8% only (European Commission, 2004). In the Walloon region and in Brussels, youth 
unemployment was even higher, with rates rising up to 32% and 35% respectively (Eurostat, 
2004).  In  Flanders,  however,  the  unemployment  rate  of  the  young  was  a  little  bit  lower 
(15.5%), but still higher than the average. 
 
The AGR is a premium granted to full-time job seekers who accept a part-time job 
(the duration of which should be less than 4/5 of a full-time job). This premium cannot be 
granted if the monthly wage of the part-time worker is higher than minimum wage (equal, in 
December 2005, to 1,234€/month for full-time workers aged 21 and up). Moreover, in order 
to receive AGR, the part-time worker should keep on searching for a full-time job. Therefore, 
the AGR can be considered as an ALMP designed to accelerate the transition to full-time 
employment. If a worker who receives AGR loses his part-time job, he will be considered as 
unemployed and will again be entitled to full-time unemployment benefits. 
 
The level of the AGR is calculated as follows. One takes the level of benefits for a 
full-time unemployed worker. One adds a bonus, which depends on family status (in June 
2004, this bonus was equal to 154 euros for cohabitants with children, 123 euros for singles 
and 92 euros for cohabitants without children). The final amount of AGR is then computed by 
deducing from that sum the wage associated to the part-time job. In other words, the AGR is 
                                                 
6 Students outside vocational/ technical training or arts must be registered in the fourth year or higher.  
7 Consequently, for some the highest attained degree may be primary education (after 6 years of schooling): the 
next level, lower secondary, is only attained after successfully completing three years of secondary education. 
This explains why in Table 1 the fraction of workers with a primary school education level is strictly positive.    
8 Our data do not allow us to observe individuals before the end of the waiting period, which means they are not 
observed at their entry in the labour market, but at their entry in ‘insured’ unemployment.    3 
 
computed using the formula: “AGR = benefits + bonus – wage from part-time job”. This 
subsidy is awarded for an indefinite time period, as long as eligibility criteria are satisfied.  
 
Cohabitants  with  children  are  more  represented  among  actual  recipients  of  AGR, 
probably because their income bonus is more generous. In 1997, they represented 64% of 
young AGR recipients (i.e. those without labour market experience who became eligible at 
the end of the aforementioned “waiting period”). Singles and cohabitants without children 
represented only 16% and 20% (respectively) of that same category of AGR recipients. 
 
Although the AGR aims at increasing workers’ employability and is supposed to serve 
as a stepping-stone to full employment, this policy may actually replace the “unemployment 
trap” by a “precarious employment trap” (Degreef, 2000). Indeed, the AGR imposes a 100% 
implicit marginal tax rate to any wage increase: for each euro added to the part-time wage, 
one euro is deduced from the bonus. This policy has been revised in July 2005, in order to 
correct this anomaly. Our study, however, evaluate the AGR policy before this reform was 
implemented. 
 
2.  Survey of the literature 
 
Different  types  of  income-support  policies  for  low-wage  workers  have  been 
implemented  in  various  European  countries  (e.g.,  “employment  premium”  in  France, 
“Working  Families  Tax  Credit”  in  the  UK).  Several  studies  suggest  that  these  policies 
accelerate the transition from unemployment to employment (e.g., Meyer, 1995; Cahuc, 2002; 
Blundell  and  Hoynes,  2004;  Francesconi  and  van  der  Klaauw,  2004 ;  Eissa  and  Hoynes, 
2005). This conclusion does not depend on whether the support is awarded to the head of 
household or is granted to individuals (which is the case of the AGR). However, most of these 
studies  concern  the  USA  and  the  UK,  where  the  minimum  wage  is  much  lower  than  in 
continental Europe. In continental European countries, the level of employment may be more 
sensitive  to  labour  costs  than  to  labour  supply  incentives  (Cahuc,  2002).  Moreover,  the 
aforementioned studies do not specifically focus on part-time workers, but, more generally, on 
low-wage workers. 
 
McCall (1996, 1997) has evaluated a system of income support for part-time workers 
in Canada. In this country, an unemployed worker who accepts a part-time job keeps his 
weekly allowance as long as his weekly wage remains below 25% of this allowance. Beyond 
that threshold, one (Canadian) dollar is deduced from the allowance for each additional dollar 
gained through part-time work. Consistent with theory, the author finds that a 50% increase in 
this income support tends to increase the probability of getting a part-time job (by 2% to 3%) 
and to decrease unemployment duration (by 2.5 to 6.2 days). These effects, however, are 
relatively small.  
 
The aforementioned studies do not specify whether income supports accelerate the 
transition to “regular” employment (i.e., non-subsidised, full-time employment). This depends 
on the rate of progression of the earnings (a function of the hourly wage and/or working 
time): if earnings increase sufficiently, the amount of the subsidy drops to zero. Theoretically, 
an  income  support  such  as  AGR  may  accelerate  as  well  as  decelerate  this  transition. 
Arguments in favour of acceleration are as follows. A job-seeker who accepts a subsidised, 
part-time job signals his motivation and attachment to the labour market to employers (Gerfin 
et al., 2002). In addition, according to human capital theory, labour market experience and on-
the-job training should lead to an increase in productivity and, in fine, in wages.    4 
 
However,  recent  empirical  studies  have  shown  that  returns  to  labour  market 
experience are lower for low-skill workers
9. Moreover, in the case of AGR, the 100% implicit 
marginal rate of taxation reinforces this “locking-in” in low wage subsidised employment 
(Calmfors, 1994 ; Van Ours, 2002). Finally, the aforementioned signalling argument may also 
slow down the transition to a regular job. For instance, employers may believe (righteously or 
not)  that  workers  who  accept  part-time  jobs  do  not  wish  to  work  full-time.  In  that  case, 
accepting a part-time job sends a negative signal to employers
10. 
 
Many  researchers  (e.g.,  Booth  et  al.,  2002;  Zijl  et  al.,  2004;  Autor  et  al.,  2005; 
D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005; Gagliarducci, 2005; Kvasnicka, 2005; Larssen et al., 2005) 
have studied the impact of temporary jobs and employment for temporary work agencies on 
the transition to regular, permanent employment. These studies report mixed results. To our 
knowledge, few researchers have studied the impact of part-time (subsidised) work on labour 
market reintegration. Buddelmeyer et al. (1995) find that in the European Union, less than 5% 
of  unemployed  workers  use  part-time  work  as  a  stepping-stone  to  full-time  employment. 
Blank (1998) shows that in the USA, men and women who work part-time tend to remain in 
that  situation  for  a  long  period  of  time,  and  experience  few  transitions  to  full-time 
employment. However, these studies are primarily descriptive, and do not allow determining 
whether accepting a part-time job accelerates the transition to a full-time job. Farber (1999) 
suggests that in the USA, part-time work may be a phase in the transition from unemployment 
to full-time employment, but his analysis remains inconclusive. 
 
Granier and Joutard (1999) is the only study that addresses the same issue as we do 
here,  using  a  similar  methodology.  They  estimate  the  impact  on  the  transition  to  regular 
employment of an income-support policy for part-time workers in France. This policy allows 
a (full-time) job seeker working less than 136 hours a month (and receiving less than 70% of 
her previous wage) to cumulate his labour income and unemployment benefits. The scheme is 
designed to prolong the worker’s entitlement to the allowance proportional to his working 
time. 
 
The French scheme provides more incentives to transit to regular employment then the 
Belgian AGR. First, the implicit withdrawal rate of the subsidy is equal to the replacement 
rate, and not to 100% as in Belgium. Second, since in France the duration of the entitlement to 
the subsidy coincides with the duration of the entitlement to the benefits, the worker who 
doesn’t  find  a  regular  job  before  the  subsidy  expires,  will  not  be  entitled  to  any  other 
allowance of the unemployment insurance system. This contrasts sharply with the Belgian 
system in which the entitlement to both the subsidy and the benefits is indefinite. 
 
Granier and Joutard (1999) conclude that this policy increases the transition to regular 
employment, especially close to the moment at which unemployment benefits expire. This 
transition is only delayed for long-term (more than 18 months) unemployed women. It is not 
clear, however, whether this acceleration is caused by income support per se, or whether it 
results from the existence of a time limit on the entitlement to the benefits. 
 
                                                 
9 Cf. Card and Robins (1999), Gladden et Taber (2000), Meghir et Whitehouse (1996), Dustmann and Meghir 
(2001), Card et Hyslop (2005). In Grogger (2005), though, returns to experience are not significantly different 
among low-skill and high-skill workers.  
10 See Ma and Weiss (1993) and McCormick (1990) for a theoretical foundation of that argument. This argument 
is referred to by Burtless (1985) and Bonnal et al. (1994 ; 1997) in their evaluation studies. See Dubin and 
Rivers (1993) for a critique of that point of view.   5 
 
3.  Data 
 
Our study uses administrative data centralised in a “Labour Market Data warehouse”. 
This database is the result of a joint effort from the central databank of the Belgian Social 
Security (BCSS) and from various social security institutions. The Data warehouse gathers 
individual and longitudinal information on the labour market histories of Belgian workers. It 
contains quarterly information on unemployment, employment (including self-employment) 
and  inactivity  spells  (identified  by  non-presence  in  any  of  the  other  spells).  It  allows  to 
identify most ALMP including subsidised employment such as AGR. 
 
The sample has been selected according to three criteria. We retain: (1) women aged 
18-25, (2) who, in 1998, were for the first time entitled to unemployment benefits, and (3) 
who did not have any labour market experience during the 9 months waiting period following 
the end of their initial schooling. This leaves us with a sample of 8630 disadvantaged women. 
The observation period stops at the end of year 2001. 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the explanatory variables. We distinguish three 
groups: (1) AGR recipients or the “treated group”, (2) individuals who experience a direct 
transition from unemployment to full-time regular employment (and constitute our “control 
group”), and (3) censored individuals. This last group includes young women who remained 
unemployed over the whole observation period (1998-2001). We also include in that group 
women who experience a transition to inactivity  (including education) or to other ALMP 
(such as training or temporarily subsidised employment). These transitions are ignored in 
order to keep the econometric model tractable, and to avoid that participation to other ALMP 
contaminates the control group. We observe 175 AGR recipients, 3458 women in the control 
group, and 4997 censored individuals. 
 
We  give  a  brief  synthetic  view  of  the  observed  differences  between  groups,  by 
comparing first the censored group and the control group, and then the treated group and the 
control group. The censored group gathers mostly inactive women, and women with long 
unemployment spells. Belgians are less represented in the censored than in the control group 
(85% versus 91%), while non-EU foreigners are slightly more represented (9% versus 4%). 
Low-skill women are also more represented in the censored than in the control group: 39% in 
the former (versus 18% only in the latter) have less than 12 years of schooling. The censored 
and control groups also differ with regard to family status: in the former, 14% of the women 
have children  younger than 3, whereas in the latter, this percentage is equal to 5% only. 
Moreover, only 67% of the women in the censored group live with their parents (versus 80% 
in  the  control  group).  This  suggests  that  the  control  group  may  face  more  difficulties  in 
finding childcare during their working hours. Finally, women in the censored group live in 
sub-regions
11 where the unemployment rate
12 is slightly higher than average. They are less 
present,  though,  in  the  Walloon  region  than  in  Flanders  or  in  Brussels;  this  is  somehow 
paradoxical, since unemployment tend to be higher than average in the Walloon region. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
11 The Belgian territory is divided in 30 sub-regions. 
12 This statistic is measured by the ONEM (Belgian Unemployment Office) as a percentage of the population 
insured against the risk of unemployment. The retained denominator is smaller than the actual labour force. 
Consequently, it blows the unemployment rate up.    6 
 
Women in the treated group (i.e. AGR recipients) are less educated: 31% have 12 
years of schooling or less (versus 18% only in the control group). Moreover, women in the 
treated group, just like those in the censored group, live less at their parents’ (64% versus 
80% in the control group), tend to have more young children (12% versus 5% in the control 
group) and live in areas where the unemployment rate is higher than average. The treated 
group therefore seems to have a lower employability, compared to the control group. A single 
indicator contradicts that observation: AGR recipients are more represented in Flanders (68% 
versus 60% in the control group), a region where the unemployment rate is lower. 
 
4.  Econometric modelling  
 
In our study, as in any evaluation study, we face the “selection bias” problem. To 
estimate the impact of AGR on the rate of transition to employment, we have to compare the 
histories of AGR recipients (treated group) to those of non-recipients (control group). By 
doing  so,  we  may  capture  not  only  the  effect  of  the  AGR  per  se,  but  also  the  effect  of 
unobserved differences  (in terms of employability, for instance) between both groups. To 
solve this problem, we control for differences between the treated and control groups on the 
basis of both observed and unobserved individual characteristics. To control for unobserved 
characteristics (unobserved heterogeneity) we rely on the “timing of events” method. This 
method  exploits  the  fact  that  unobserved  heterogeneity  affects  the  transition  to  regular 
employment throughout the unemployment spell, whereas the treatment (AGR in this study) 
may only influence this transition from the moment at which the treatment occurs. By this 
“discontinuity”,  one  can  identify  the  treatment  effect  from  the  selection  effect  without 
imposing any “exclusion restrictions” on the observed explanatory variables. Abbring and 
Van  den  Berg  (2003,  2004)  indeed  showed  that  non-parametric  identification  is  ensured 
provided that: 
(1) Agents do not anticipate this starting date. This is a reasonable assumption here, since 
it is difficult for an unemployed worker to anticipate if and when she will receive a 
part-time job offer. 
(2) The econometrician has precise information concerning the timing of transitions; 
(3) Observed and unobserved individual characteristics influence the rates of transitions 
(to subsidised employment and to regular employment) proportionally. 
(4) There are no unobserved random shocks that are correlated with the timing of the 
treatment; we try to avoid this by conditioning on a time-varying indicator of the local 
unemployment rate.  
If these conditions are satisfied, estimating a bivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) 
model corrects for the selection bias. 
 
The above-mentioned second condition is not completely satisfied in this application, 
since we only have quarterly information. However, Gaure et al. (2005) have shown, using an 
extensive Monte Carlo analysis, that Abbring and Van den Berg (2003)’s method is extremely 
reliable, even for time-grouped data. To apply this method, it is sufficient that the assumption 
of proportionality be satisfied and that the unobserved heterogeneity distribution be flexible. 
 
4.1. The bivariate MPH model  
 
We  estimate  a  competing-risks  duration  model  in  which  transition  rates  are 
proportional  to  observed  and  unobserved  destination  specific  (e  =  employment;  p  = 
programme  (AGR)  participation)  explanatory  variables,  denoted  X  and  V  =  (vp,  ve) 
respectively. Variables X and V are independently distributed. In this model, transitions to   7 
 
AGR on the one hand and to regular employment on the other are represented by two latent 
continuous  durations,  respectively  Tp  and  Te.  More  generally,  we  will  use  index  p  for 
parameters and variables related to the AGR policy, and index e for parameters and variables 
related to regular employment.  
 
The  distribution  of  (Tp, Te)  conditional  on  (X,  vp,  ve)  is  characterised  by  hazard 
functions. If we assume that these are of the MPH form:
13 
 
  ln qp(t | X, vp, ve) = ln lp(t) + X’bp + vp 
(1) 
  ln qe(t |tp, X, vp, ve) = ln le(t) + X’be  +d.I(t>tp) + ve 
 
where lp(t) and le(t) represent the baseline hazard for transitions to AGR and to regular 
employment respectively, and where I(.) is an indicator function, equal to 1 if the argument is 
true, and to 0 otherwise. Consequently, d measure the impact of AGR on the transition to full-
time (regular) employment. We impose this effect to be independent of other explanatory 
variables. Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) show that the interactions of this effect with 
other explanatory variables can be identified. In our study, however, the small number of 
AGR recipients does not allow for such a flexible specification. 
 
In our database, durations are not measured in continuous time, but in quarters. This leads us 
to specify the baseline hazard as piecewise constant. The time axis is divided into m intervals 
Il = [tl,  tl+1[,  where  l = 1, 2,  …,  m  and  t1 < t2 < … < tm,  with  t1 = 0  and  tm+1 = ¥.  The 
baseline hazard can then be written: 







= ∑  
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= ∑  




l ) is an indicator 
equal to 1 if a transition to AGR (full-time employment) occurs during interval Il and to 0 
otherwise.  
 
The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood using the BFGS algorithm. We distinguish 
three  types  of  contributions  to  the  likelihood,  which  depend  on  individual  labour  market 
histories: lu for right-censored individuals at time tk
14; lp for AGR recipients between tk-1 and 






                                                 
13 One of our explanatory variables is time varying, but, for the sake of simplicity, we do not condition X on time 
in Equation (1). Our time-varying variable is the rate of unemployment in the sub-region of residence. We 
consider its evolution, starting at the time when the individual becomes entitled to unemployment benefits. This 
variable controls for seasonality and business cycle effects in local labour markets. 
14 Women experiencing a transition to inactivity or to another ALMP are censored at the end of the quarter 
preceding this transition. Women who are unemployed during the whole observation period are censored at the 
end of year 2001.   8 
 
 
These contributions are written: 
 
lu(V)= Prob(Tp>tk, Te>tk|X,V) = Su(tk½X, ve, vp) 
(3)  lp(V)= Prob(tk-1<Tp£tk|X,V)=
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where Su is the survival function in the initial state (unemployment u).  
 
The survival rate in unemployment at time tk (i.e. the probability of still being unemployed at 
time tk) is denoted Su(tk | .) and can be expressed in terms of the hazard function as in (4): 
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  The log-likelihood can then be written as the sum of individual contributions: 
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where Jmi is equal to 1 if lmi is the contribution of individual i to the likelihood (m = u, p, e), 
and to 0 otherwise. 
 
In our application, the model is estimated three times: first without controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity – which is equivalent to setting V = (0,0) – and twice with a different form of 
the  unobserved  heterogeneity  distribution.  In  these  last  two  cases,  we  integrate  the 
contributions  to  the  likelihood  with  respect  to  V  in  order  to  get  the  unconditional 
contributions: 
 
(8)  lm = ∫V lm(V)dG(V) 
 
where G is the joint distribution function of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. We can 
control  for  selection  on  unobservables,  as  long  the  specification  of  the  heterogeneity 
distribution allows for a correlation between vp et ve. 
 
4.2. Specification of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution 
 
Gaure et al. (2005) show that, in order to get unbiased estimates, one must correctly 
specify  the  heterogeneity  distribution.  In  order  to  do  so,  we  implement  a  non-parametric 
approximation of the heterogeneity distribution using a finite number of ‘points of support’ 
(Lindsay, 1983 ; Heckman et Singer, 1984). In order to find the ‘correct’ specification, we 
follow Gaure et al. (2005)’s approach by gradually introducing more points of support, until 
the likelihood stops increasing. 
   9 
 
First of all, we impose a one-factor loading specification for G, in which the factor 
consists in two points of support. This specification is widely used in the literature. Its main 
drawback  is  that  it  strongly  constrains  the  correlation  between  unobserved  heterogeneity 
terms:  only  perfect  correlation  or  no  correlation  are  allowed  (Van  den  Berg,  2001).  To 
overcome  this  problem,  we  impose  a  second,  more  flexible  specification  for  G,  using  a 
discrete distribution with 4 points of supports. This flexible distribution allows for any type of 
correlation between ve and vp. It is possible to show that the first specification is nested in the 
second one. In our empirical analysis, the second specification, with 4 points of support, has 
not been rejected. Moreover, our procedure, which follows Gaure et al. (2005), suggests that 
there is no reason to add more than four points of support to the heterogeneity distribution. 
  
In the first specification, we assume that ve can take two different values ve1 et ve2, and 
that vp is defined as the product of ve and g, a parameter to be estimated: vp = g.ve. As the 
results, the probabilities associated to the points of support can be defined as: 
 
(9)  P1 = Prob(ve = ve1, vp = g.ve1) 
  P2 = Prob(ve = ve2, vp = g.ve2) 
 
We specify P1 et P2 using a Logit model: 
 












In the second specification, with 4 points of support, we assume that vm (m = p, e) can take 
two different values vm1 et vm2. The four resulting probabilities are defined as follows: 
 
(11)  P11 = Prob(ve = ve1, vp = vp1) = p1   
  P12 = Prob(ve = ve1, vp = vp2) = p2 
  P21 = Prob(ve = ve2, vp = vp1) = p3 
  P22 = Prob(ve = ve2, vp = vp2) = p4 
 
Probabilities p1 to p4 are specified using a multinomial Logit model: 
 





























5.  Results 
 
Our estimation results are presented in details in Table 2, which was separated in three 
parts in order to make reading easier: Table 2.a concerns transitions to full-time (regular) 
employment, Table 2.b  concerns transitions to subsidised employment (AGR policy),  and 
Table  2.c  gives  goodness-of-fit  statistics  as  well  as  information  on  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity distribution. Each table compares three different sets of results: without control 
for unobserved heterogeneity, with the one-factor loading heterogeneity distribution, and with 
the  flexible  heterogeneity  distribution.  For  each  set  of  results  we  give  the  estimated 
coefficients, exponential of the estimated coefficient, standard deviation, and p-value. For the 
sake of concision, we only comment our main results, and in particular the impact of AGR on 
the transition to regular employment, as well as the influence of unobserved heterogeneity.   10 
 
 
TABLES 2.a, 2.b, 2.c ABOUT HERE 
 
In  the  model  without  heterogeneity,  going  through  the  AGR  policy  significantly 
increases the rate of transition (hazard) to regular employment: the estimated coefficient is 
equal  to  0.73,  which  corresponds  to  a  hazard  twice  as  high  as  in  the  control  group  (the 
multiplier of the hazard function is given by exp(0.73) = 2.08). However, this significant 
effect disappears as soon as we introduce a control for unobserved heterogeneity in the model: 
the effect of the AGR is insignificant in the model with a one-factor loading distribution, as 
well as in the model with a discrete distribution with 4 points of support. 
 
Although each model presents the same Akaike Information Criterion (AIC = 2.83), 
the  models  incorporating  a  control  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  seem  to  have  a  higher 
explanatory power. Introducing a discrete distribution with 4 points of support, though, does 
not increase the value of the likelihood. A distribution with 2 points of support therefore 
seems sufficient to capture the selection on unobservables. 
 
The estimation suggests that AGR recipients have unobserved characteristics, which 
would  have  enhanced  their  transition  to  regular  employment,  even  in  the  absence  of  this 
income-support  policy.  Considering  these  unobserved  elements  is  crucial:  once  they  are 
controlled  for,  the  effect  of  the  AGR  is  no  longer  significant.  These  observations  are 
consistent with the idea, often mentioned in the literature, that wages for low-skilled workers 
increase very slowly, and with the fact that the 100% implicit marginal rate of withdrawal of 
the subsidy makes such increases even slower and unlikely (cf. Sections 1 and 2). 
 
Nevertheless, the existence of unobserved elements playing in favour of the transition 
to regular employment, and the fact that the parameter associated to AGR remains positive in 
the models with heterogeneity suggest that accepting a part-time job sends a positive signal to 
employers.  Thus,  accepting  to  enter  subsidised  part-time  employment  seems  to  signal 
motivation and willingness to work, rather than adverse selection. We therefore anticipate that 
the recent reform of the AGR policy, in which the implicit marginal withdrawal rate of the 
subsidy is reduced, will reinforce this positive effect. This is matter for future research. 
 
Secondary results bring to light determinants of the transition to unemployment that 
are  often  quoted  in  the  literature:  nationality,  education  level,  and  location.  In  all  model 
specifications,  non-Belgian  women  have  a  significantly  lower  transition  rate  to  full-time 
employment. Additionally, women who originate from non-EU countries also have a lower 
transition rate to subsidised employment (i.e. they are also less likely to access AGR). Women 
who have less (more) than 12-14 years of schooling are less (more) likely to experience a 
transition to regular employment. More educated women are more likely to enter subsidised 
employment than less educated (according to the models with heterogeneity). 
 
The regional variable displays disparities between Flanders on the one hand, and the 
Walloon region and Brussels on the other. Regional location does not influence the transition 
to subsidised employment; however, it affects the transition to regular employment. Thus, 
young  Flemish  women  have  a  significantly  higher  transition  rate  to  regular  employment 
(+35% to +45%, depending on the model). 
 
 




In this paper, we evaluated the effect of an income-support policy (known as AGR) for 
unemployed persons accepting to work part-time. The analysis was performed on a sample of 
8630 long-term unemployed young women without prior labour market experience. On the 
basis  of  the  “timing  of  events  method”,  we  estimated  the  impact  of  accepting  such  a 
subsidised part-time job on the transition to full-time employment. The econometric model 
allows to control for selection on both observables and unobservables. 
 
Our estimation results suggest that AGR recipients have unobserved characteristics 
that would have favoured their transition to full-time employment, even in the absence of an 
income support. Controlling for these unobserved characteristics is fundamental: as soon as 
one does this, the coefficient associated to AGR becomes insignificant. This observation is 
consistent with the finding that wages for low-skill workers increase very slowly, and with the 
possibility  that  the  100%  implicit  marginal  withdrawal  rate  of  the  AGR  makes  wages 
progression even slower. On the other hand, the fact that unobserved characteristics accelerate 
the transition to regular employment, and that the effect of the AGR remains positive even 
when insignificant, suggests that programme participants send employers a positive signal 
(motivation, willingness to work, etc.). We therefore expect the recent reform of the AGR 
policy, in which the implicit marginal withdrawal rate of the subsidy is reduced, to reinforce 




Abbring,  J.  H.  and  van  den  Berg,  G.  J.  (2004),  “Analyzing  the  Effect  of  Dynamically 
Assigned  Treatments  Using  Duration  Models,  Binary  Treatment  Models,  and  Panel  Data 
Models”, Empirical Economics, 29(1), 5-20. 
 
Abbring,  J.  H.  and  van  den  Berg,  G.  J.  (2003),  “The  Nonparametric  Identification  of 
Treatment Effects in Duration Models”, Econometrica, 71, 1491-1517. 
 
Autor, D.H. and S.N. Houseman (2005), “Do Temporary Help Jobs Improve Labor Market 
Outcomes  for  Low-Skilled  Workers?  Evidence  from  Random  Assignments”,  Uppjohn 
Institute Staff Working Paper, n° 05-124, Kalamazoo: Uppjohn Institute.  
 
Blank, R. M. (1998), “Labor Market Dynamics and Part-time Work”,  Research in Labor 
Economics, Polachek, Solomom, ed., Greenwich, Vol.17, pp.57-93, CT: JAI Press. 
 
Blundell and Hoynes (2003), “Has "In-Work" Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?”, in 
Card, D., Blundell, R. and R. B. Freeman (eds.), Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic 
Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980-2000,  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
  
Bonnal, L., D. Fougère and A. Sérandon (1994), “L’impact des dispositifs d’emploi sur le 
devenir  des  jeunes  chômeurs :  une  évaluation  économétrique  sur  données  longitudinales”, 
Economie et Prévision, n° 115, 1-28. 
 
Bonnal,  L.,  D.  Fougère  and  A.  Sérandon  (1997),  “Evaluation  the  Impact  of  French 
Employment Policies on Individual Labour Market Histories”, Review of Economic Studies, 
64, 683-713.  
   12 
 
Booth, A.L., M. Francesconi and J. Frank (2002), “Temporary Jobs: stepping-stones or dead 
ends?”, The Economic Journal, 112 , 189-215. 
 
Cahuc, P. (2002), “A quoi sert la prime pour l’emploi ?”, Revue française d’Economie, vol. 
16, 3-61. 
 
Calmfors, L. (1994), “Active Labor Market Policy and Unemployment – A Framework for 
the Analysis of Crucial Design Features” OECD Economic Studies, 22. 
 
Card,  D.  and  D.  R.  Hyslop  (2005),  “Estimating  the  Effects  of  a  Time-Limited  Earnings 
subsidy for Welfare-Leavers”, Econometrica, 73(6), 1723-1770. 
 
Card D. and Ph. K. Robins (1999), “Measuring “Wage Progression” Among Former Welfare 
Recipients”, Center for Labor Economics, Discussion Paper, Berkeley. 
 
D’Addio, A. and M . Rosholm (2005), “Exits from temporary jobs in Europe: A competing 
Risks analysis”, Labour Economics, 12, 449-468. 
 
De Greef I. (2000), “Les pièges financiers en Belgique : Aperçu de la législation du chômage, 
des spécificités institutionnelles et études de cas types”, Revue Belge de Sécurité Sociale, 
42 (2), pp. 265-327. 
 
Dustmann,  C.  and  C.  Meghir  (2005),  “Wages,  Experience  and  Seniority”,  Review  of 
Economic Studies, 72, 77-108.  
 
Eissa, N. and H. Hoynes (2005), “Behavioral Responses to Taxes : Lessons from the EITC 
and Labor Supply”, NBER working paper, n° 11729.  
 
Farber, H.S. (1999) “Alternative and Part-Time Employment Arrangements as a Response to 
Job Loss”, Journal of Labor Economics, Part 2, 17(4), S142-S169  
 
Francesconi M. and W. Van der Klaauw (2004), “The Consequences of ‘In-Work’ Benefit 
Reform in Britain: New Evidence from Panel Data”, IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 1248, 
Bonn: IZA. 
 
Gagliarducci, S. (2005), “The Dynamics of Repeated Temporary Jobs”, Labour Economics, 
12, 429-448. 
 
Gaure, S., K. Roed and T. Zhang (2005), “Time and Causality: A Monte Carlo Assessment of 
the  Timing-of-Events  Approach”,  Memorandum,  n°  19-2005,  Oslo:  Department  of 
Economics, University of Oslo.   
 
Gerfin, M., M. Lechner M. and H. Steiger (2002), “Does Subsidised Temporary Employment 
Get the Unemployed Back to Work? An Econometric Analysis of Two Different Schemes”, 
IZA Discussion Paper, n° 606, Bonn: IZA. 
 
Gladden, T. and C. Taber (2000), “Wage Progression among Less Skilled Workers” in D.  
Card and R. M. Blank (eds.) Finding Jobs: Work and Welfare Reform, New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
   13 
 
Granier  and  Joutard  (1999),  “L’activité  réduite  favorise-t-elle  la  sortie  du  chômage ?”, 
Economie et Statistique, N° 321-322 (1/2), 133-148.  
 
Grogger, J. (2005), “Welfare Reform, Returns to Experience, and Wages: Using Reservation 
Wages to Account for Selection Bias”, NBER Working paper, N°11621.  
 
Heckman, J. and Singer, B. (1984), “A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distributional 
Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data”, Econometrica, 52, 271-320. 
 
Kvasnicka, M. (2005), “Does Temporary Agency Work Provide a Stepping Stone to Regular 
Employment?”, SFB 649 Discussion Paper, n° 2005-31, Berlin: Humboldt University.  
 
Larssen, L., L. Lindqvist and O. Nordström Skans (2005), “Stepping-Stones or Dead-Ends : 
an Analysis of Swedish Replacement Contracts”, IFAU working paper, n° 2005-18, Uppsala : 
IFAU. 
 
Lindsay,  B.  G.  (1983),  “The  Geometry  of  Mixture  Likelihoods:  A  General  Theory”,  The 
Annals of Statistics, Vol. 11, 86-94. 
 
Ma,  C.A.,  and  A.  Weiss  (1993),  “A  Signalling  Theory  of  Unemployment”,  European 
Economic Review, 37, 135-157. 
 
McCormick, B. (1990), “A Theory of Signalling during Job Search, Employment, Efficiency, 
and “Stigmatised” Jobs”, Review of Economic Studies, 57, 299-313. 
 
Mc  Call  (1996),  “Unemployment  Insurance  Rules,  Joblessness,  and  Part-Time  Work”, 
Econometrica, 64, 647-682.  
 
Mc Call (1997), “The Determinants of Full-time versus Part-time Reemployment following 
Displacement”, Journal of Labor Economics, 15 (4), 714-734.  
 
Meghir C. and E. Whitehouse (1996), “The Evolution of Wages in the UK: Evidence from 
Micro Data ”, The Journal of Labor Economics, 14(1), 1-25. 
 
Meyer,  B.  D.  (1995),  “Lessons  from  the  U.S.  Unemployment  Insurance  Experiments”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 33, 91-131. 
 
Van  den  Berg  G.  (2001),  “Duration  models :  specification,  identification,  and  multiple 
durations”, in J.J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Volume V, 
Amsterdam : North-Holland. 
 
Van Ours, J. C. (2004), “The locking-in effect of subsidized jobs”, Journal of Comparative 
Economics,  32/1, 37-52. 
 
Zijl, M., G. Van den Berg, and A. Heyma (2004), “Stepping Stones for the Unemployed: The 
Effect of Temporary Jobs on the Duration until Regular Work”,  IZA discussion paper, n° 
1241, Bonn: IZA. 
   14 
 
Table 1 – summary statistics
15 
VARIABLES  sub-groups 
  Full  employment 






Age in years at the end of 1997   20.75 (2.02)  20.42 (2.03)  20.14 (1.90)  20.39 (1.98) 
Nationality :         
  Belgian  0.911  0.920  0.853  0.877 
  Non-Belgian EU  0.048  0.0457  0.059  0.055 
  Non EU  0.041  0.0343  0.088  0.068 
Education level:         
  Primary (6 to 9 years schooling)  0.039  0.074  0.107  0.079 
  Lower secondary (9 to 12 years)    0.139  0.234  0.281  0.223 
  Higher secondary (12 to 14 
years of schooling)  0.495  0.457  0.469  0.479 
  Higher education, non-university 
(14 years of schooling and more)  0.187  0.160  0.080  0.124 
  University (16 years of schooling 
and more)  0.075  0.069  0.033  0.050 
  Other  0.005  0.006  0.010  0.008 
  Unknown  0.060  0  0.021  0.036 
Relation to head of household:         
  Head  0.066  0.177  0.114  0.096 
  Spouse  0.033  0.051  0.070  0.055 
  Child  0.802  0.640  0.674  0.724 
  Other  0.018  0.040  0.026  0.023 
  No family relationship  0.081  0.091  0.115  0.101 
# persons in household:         
  #  of persons, [0-1) year-old  0.030  0.091  0.079  0.060 
  #  of persons, [1-3) year-old  0.024  0.034  0.063  0.047 
  #  of persons, [3-6) year-old  0.037  0.017  0.055  0.047 
  #  of persons, [6-12) year-old  0.112  0.069  0.140  0.128 
  #  of persons, [12-18) year-old  0.250  0.211  0.272  0.262 
  #  of persons, [18-30) year-old  0.488  0.377  0.484  0.483 
  #  of persons, [30-50) year-old  0.630  0.446  0.569  0.591 
  #  of persons, [50-65) year-old  0.368  0.297  0.295  0.324 
  #  of persons, [65-75) year-old  0.033  0.046  0.036  0.035 
  #  of persons, [75+) year-old  0.019  0.034  0.014  0.016 
Unemployment rate, end 1997  25.84 (8.58)  28.05 (8.12)  27.64 (8.17)  26.93 (8.38) 
Region :         
Walloon region  0.303  0.200  0.207  0.245 
Flanders  0.598  0.680  0.666  0.639 
Brussels  0.098  0.120  0.127  0.116 
Number of observations  3.458  175  4.997  8.630 
Columns: average value 











                                                 
15 The month of entry in unemployment is not presented here; this information is available upon request from the 
authors.   15 
 
Table 2a – duration model estimates: transition to regular employment 
VARIABLES  No heterogeneity  Heterogeneity : 2 pts of support  heterogeneity: 4 pts of support 
  b  Exp b  s  p-val.  b  Exp b  s  p-val.  b  Exp b  s  p-val. 
Constant  -2.57  0.08  0.13  0.00                 
Age in 1997  0.01  1.01  0.01  0.32  0.01  1.01  0.01  0.30  0.01  1.01  0.01  0.28 
Nationality :                         
  Belgian (reference)                         
  Non-Belgian EU  -0.15  0.86  0.08  0.03  -0.16  0.85  0.09  0.03  -0.17  0.85  0.09  0.03 
  Non EU  -0.64  0.53  0.09  0.00  -0.71  0.49  0.10  0.00  -0.72  0.49  0.10  0.00 
Education level:                         
  Primary  -0.88  0.41  0.09  0.00  -0.96  0.38  0.10  0.00  -0.97  0.38  0.10  0.00 
  Lower secondary  -0.60  0.55  0.05  0.00  -0.65  0.52  0.06  0.00  -0.65  0.52  0.06  0.00 
  Higher second. (ref.)                         
  Higher, non-university  0.71  2.04  0.05  0.00  0.80  2.24  0.06  0.00  0.81  2.25  0.06  0.00 
  University  0.76  2.13  0.07  0.00  0.84  2.31  0.08  0.00  0.84  2.32  0.09  0.00 
  Other  -0.70  0.49  0.23  0.00  -0.75  0.47  0.26  0.00  -0.75  0.47  0.25  0.00 
  Unknown  0.95  2.59  0.08  0.00  1.00  2.73  0.09  0.00  1.01  2.76  0.10  0.00 
Month of entry:                         
  January  0.13  1.14  0.14  0.16  0.13  1.14  0.14  0.17  0.13  1.14  0.15  0.20 
  February  -0.13  0.88  0.15  0.20  -0.14  0.87  0.16  0.19  -0.14  0.87  0.17  0.20 
  March  0.13  1.13  0.10  0.11  0.14  1.15  0.12  0.12  0.14  1.15  0.11  0.11 
  May  0.08  1.09  0.06  0.06  0.09  1.10  0.06  0.05  0.09  1.10  0.06  0.07 
  June  0.07  1.07  0.04  0.06  0.08  1.08  0.05  0.05  0.08  1.08  0.05  0.06 
  July  -0.14  0.87  0.07  0.03  -0.15  0.86  0.07  0.02  -0.16  0.86  0.08  0.03 
  August   -0.27  0.76  0.10  0.00  -0.29  0.75  0.11  0.00  -0.29  0.75  0.11  0.00 
  September  -0.19  0.83  0.11  0.04  -0.20  0.82  0.12  0.05  -0.21  0.81  0.12  0.04 
  October  -0.18  0.83  0.12  0.07  -0.20  0.82  0.13  0.06  -0.20  0.82  0.13  0.06 
  November  -0.33  0.72  0.13  0.01  -0.32  0.73  0.15  0.02  -0.31  0.73  0.14  0.01 
  December  -0.16  0.85  0.14  0.12  -0.17  0.84  0.14  0.12  -0.17  0.84  0.15  0.12 
  April (reference)                         
Relation to the head :                         
  Head  -0.16  0.85  0.09  0.03  -0.16  0.85  0.09  0.04  -0.17  0.85  0.10  0.04 
  Spouse  -0.31  0.74  0.11  0.00  -0.34  0.71  0.12  0.00  -0.35  0.70  0.12  0.00 
  Child                         
  Other  -0.17  0.85  0.14  0.12  -0.18  0.83  0.15  0.11  -0.19  0.83  0.15  0.11 
  No family relationship  -0.04  0.96  0.07  0.30  -0.04  0.96  0.08  0.29  -0.05  0.95  0.08  0.28 
# of persons:                         
  # of [0-1) year-old  -0.62  0.54  0.10  0.00  -0.63  0.53  0.11  0.00 
  # of [1-3) year-old  -0.53  0.59  0.07  0.00  -0.50  0.61  0.11  0.00  -0.50  0.60  0.12  0.00 
  # of [3-6) year-old  0.05  1.06  0.08  0.25  0.05  1.05  0.09  0.29  0.05  1.05  0.09  0.30 
  # of [6-12) year-old  -0.08  0.92  0.04  0.03  -0.08  0.92  0.05  0.04 
  # of [12-18) year-old  -0.09  0.92  0.02  0.00  -0.10  0.90  0.03  0.00  -0.10  0.90  0.03  0.00 
  # of [18-30) year-old  0.00  1.00  0.02  0.48  0.00  1.00  0.03  0.48  0.00  1.00  0.03  0.48 
  # of [30-50) year-old  0.13  1.14  0.03  0.00  0.15  1.16  0.04  0.00  0.14  1.16  0.04  0.00 
  # of [50-65) year-old  0.05  1.05  0.04  0.09  0.05  1.05  0.04  0.09  0.05  1.05  0.04  0.11 
  # of [65-75) year-old  -0.10  0.91  0.09  0.12  -0.10  0.90  0.09  0.13  -0.10  0.90  0.10  0.15 
  # of [75+) year-old  0.18  1.20  0.12  0.06  0.21  1.23  0.13  0.05  0.21  1.24  0.13  0.05 
Unemp. rate, end 97  -0.02  0.98  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.99  0.02  0.34  -0.03  0.97  0.00  0.00 
D D D D unemployment rate  -0.02  0.98  0.01  0.01  -0.02  0.98  0.01  0.02  -0.02  0.98  0.01  0.01 
Region :                         
Walloon region (ref.)                         
Flanders  0.30  1.35  0.07  0.00  0.36  1.44  0.07  0.00  0.36  1.43  0.08  0.00 
Brussels  0.09  1.09  0.07  0.09  0.11  1.11  0.07  0.06  0.11  1.11  0.07  0.07 
Baseline :  2
nd quarter   -0.15  0.86  0.06  0.00  -0.07  0.93  0.06  0.13  -0.06  0.94  0.06  0.17 
     3
rd quarter  -0.31  0.73  0.07  0.00  -0.18  0.83  0.07  0.01  -0.17  0.84  0.08  0.02 
     4
th quarter  -0.33  0.72  0.07  0.00  -0.17  0.85  0.08  0.02  -0.15  0.86  0.09  0.06 
     5
th quarter  -0.38  0.69  0.08  0.00  -0.18  0.84  0.09  0.03  -0.16  0.85  0.11  0.07 
     6
th quarter   -0.48  0.62  0.09  0.00  -0.25  0.78  0.11  0.01  -0.23  0.80  0.12  0.03 
     7
th quarter  -0.59  0.55  0.11  0.00  -0.34  0.71  0.12  0.00  -0.31  0.73  0.13  0.01 
     8
th quarter   -0.72  0.49  0.12  0.00  -0.44  0.64  0.14  0.00  -0.42  0.66  0.15  0.00 
     9
th quarter  -0.81  0.44  0.14  0.00  -0.52  0.59  0.15  0.00  -0.49  0.61  0.17  0.00 
     10
th q.   -0.93  0.39  0.17  0.00  -0.62  0.54  0.17  0.00  -0.59  0.55  0.19  0.00 
     11
th q.  -0.76  0.47  0.16  0.00  -0.44  0.64  0.17  0.00  -0.41  0.66  0.18  0.01 
     12
th q.  -1.52  0.22  0.27  0.00  -1.20  0.30  0.28  0.00  -1.16  0.31  0.28  0.00 
     13
th q.  -1.29  0.28  0.24  0.00  -0.95  0.39  0.24  0.00  -0.92  0.40  0.27  0.00 
     14
th q.  -1.77  0.17  0.33  0.00  -1.42  0.24  0.34  0.00  -1.39  0.25  0.35  0.00 
     15
th q.  -2.60  0.07  0.64  0.00  -2.24  0.11  0.70  0.00  -2.21  0.11  0.66  0.00 
Effect of AGR (d d d d)  0.73  2.08  0.12  0.00  0.12  1.13  0.34  0.36  0.17  1.19  0.31  0.29   16 
 
Tableau 2b - duration model estimates: transition to ALMP 
VARIABLES  No heterogeneity  Heterogeneity : 2 pts of support  heterogeneity: 4 pts of support 
  b  Exp b  s  p-val.  b  Exp b  s  p-val.  b  Exp b  s  p-val. 
Constant  -5.80  0.00  0.68  0.00                 
Age in 1997  -0.08  0.92  0.06  0.08  -0.08  0.92  0.05  0.05  -0.08  0.92  0.06  0.10 
Nationality :                         
  Belgian (reference)                         
  Non-Belgian EU  -0.24  0.79  0.40  0.28  -0.26  0.77  0.38  0.24  -0.26  0.77  0.42  0.27 
  Non EU  -0.93  0.40  0.45  0.02  -1.08  0.34  0.44  0.01  -1.07  0.34  0.47  0.01 
Education level:                         
  Primary  -0.57  0.56  0.34  0.05  -0.71  0.49  0.33  0.02  -0.69  0.50  0.36  0.03 
  Lower secondary  -0.28  0.75  0.21  0.09  -0.39  0.68  0.22  0.04  -0.38  0.69  0.23  0.05 
  Higher second. (ref.)                         
  Higher, non-university  0.93  2.53  0.28  0.00  1.12  3.07  0.26  0.00  1.11  3.03  0.31  0.00 
  University  1.28  3.59  0.39  0.00  1.43  4.18  0.38  0.00  1.41  4.10  0.41  0.00 
  Other or unknown  -1.36  0.26  1.23  0.13  -1.38  0.25  0.96  0.07  -1.42  0.24  1.25  0.13 
Month of entry:                         
  January  0.09  1.09  0.54  0.44  0.12  1.13  0.51  0.41  0.10  1.11  0.57  0.43 
  February  -0.77  0.46  0.79  0.17  -0.77  0.46  0.93  0.20  -0.77  0.46  0.81  0.17 
  March  -0.63  0.53  0.63  0.16  -0.61  0.54  0.69  0.19  -0.60  0.55  0.68  0.19 
  May  0.09  1.10  0.26  0.36  0.08  1.08  0.26  0.38  0.09  1.09  0.27  0.37 
  June  -0.47  0.63  0.24  0.03  -0.44  0.64  0.23  0.03  -0.44  0.65  0.25  0.04 
  July  0.26  1.29  0.27  0.17  0.21  1.23  0.27  0.22  0.22  1.24  0.29  0.22 
  August   -1.17  0.31  0.62  0.03  -1.23  0.29  0.61  0.02  -1.22  0.30  0.66  0.03 
  September  -0.09  0.91  0.45  0.42  -0.11  0.90  0.46  0.41  -0.11  0.90  0.48  0.41 
  October  0.48  1.62  0.39  0.11  0.47  1.60  0.39  0.12  0.48  1.61  0.44  0.14 
  November  -0.13  0.88  0.59  0.41  -0.20  0.82  0.57  0.36  -0.19  0.83  0.60  0.38 
  December  -0.13  0.88  0.56  0.41  -0.15  0.86  0.59  0.40  -0.14  0.87  0.57  0.40 
  April (reference)                         
Relation to the head :                         
  Head  -0.16  0.85  0.34  0.32  -0.26  0.77  0.33  0.22  -0.24  0.79  0.37  0.26 
  Spouse  -0.68  0.51  0.48  0.08  -0.85  0.43  0.44  0.03  -0.81  0.44  0.52  0.06 
  Child                         
  Other  0.25  1.29  0.52  0.31  0.01  1.01  0.52  0.49  0.01  1.01  0.59  0.50 
  No family relationship  -0.57  0.56  0.35  0.05  -0.65  0.52  0.35  0.03  -0.63  0.53  0.39  0.05 
# of persons:                         
  # of [0-1) year-old  0.23  1.26  0.31  0.22  0.13  1.14  0.27  0.32  0.13  1.14  0.34  0.35 
  # of [1-3) year-old  -0.39  0.68  0.43  0.18  -0.38  0.68  0.46  0.20 
  # of [3-6) year-old  -0.39  0.68  0.50  0.22  -0.39  0.67  0.50  0.22 
  # of [6-12) year-old  -0.30  0.74  0.25  0.11  -0.31  0.74  0.26  0.12 
  # of [12-18) year-old 
-0.08  0.92  0.10  0.22 
0.14  1.15  0.14  0.16  0.14  1.15  0.16  0.19 
  # of [18-30) year-old  -0.13  0.88  0.13  0.15  -0.14  0.87  0.12  0.12  -0.14  0.87  0.13  0.15 
  # of [30-50) year-old  -0.56  0.57  0.16  0.00  -0.55  0.58  0.19  0.00 
  # of [50-65) year-old  -0.45  0.64  0.17  0.00  -0.43  0.65  0.21  0.02 
  # of [65-75) year-old 
-0.43  0.65  0.17  0.01 
-0.07  0.93  0.33  0.41  -0.06  0.94  0.32  0.43 
  # of [75+) year-old  0.56  1.75  0.47  0.12  0.60  1.82  0.44  0.09  0.63  1.88  0.53  0.12 
Unemp. rate, end 97  0.00  1.00  0.02  0.50  -0.01  0.99  0.02  0.34  -0.01  0.99  0.02  0.40 
D D D D unemployment rate  0.02  1.02  0.04  0.29  0.02  1.02  0.03  0.30  0.02  1.02  0.04  0.33 
Region :                         
Walloon region (ref.)                         
Flanders  0.44  1.56  0.38  0.13  0.49  1.63  0.35  0.08  0.50  1.65  0.40  0.11 
Brussels  0.23  1.25  0.31  0.23  0.24  1.27  0.28  0.20  0.24  1.27  0.32  0.23 
Baseline :  5-8 quart.  0.18  1.20  0.23  0.21  0.44  1.56  0.22  0.02  0.44  1.56  0.24  0.03 
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Table 2c - duration model estimates: goodness-of-fit statistics and unobserved heterogeneity 
GOODNESS-OF-FIT  No heterogeneity  Heterogeneity : 2 pts of support  heterogeneity: 4 pts of support 
Log-likelihood  -12103  -12099  -12099 
# of variables  87  96  97 
# of observations  8630  8630  8630 
UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY  No heterogeneity  Heterogeneity : 2 pts of support  heterogeneity: 4 pts of support 
Points of support:    b  Exp b  s  p-val.  b  Exp b  s  p-val. 
 ve1    -3.18  0.04  0.27  0.00  -3.16  0.04  0.22  0.00 
 ve2    -2.13  0.12  0.22  0.00  -2.05  0.13  0.21  0.00 
 vp1             -6.83  0.00  0.94  0.00 
 vp2            -4.82  0.01  0.78  0.00 
Gamma    2.24  9.41  0.26  0.00         
Probability mass (Logit):    b  Exp b  s  p-val.  b  Exp b  s  p-val. 
Lambda / Lambda1    0.12  1.13  0.73  0.43  0.26  1.30  0.46  0.29 
Lambda2             Converges to -¥: Not estimated 
Lambda3             Converges to -¥: Not estimated 
Resulting probabilities:    Heterogeneity : 2 pts of support  heterogeneity: 4 pts of support 
2 pts of support  4 pts of support       
P1  P11    0.968  0.565 
P2  P12    0.032  Restricted to 0  
  P21      Restricted to 0  
  P22      0.435 
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